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Oct 20, 2009

Tweaking Your Neurons

This interesting article, recently appeared in hplusmagazine, reviews the emerging trends in "neuroenhancement"

http://hplusmagazine.com/articles/neuro/tweaking-your-neu...

Neurons

 

The 'I' and the 'Me' in self-referential awareness: a neurocognitive hypothesis

The 'I' and the 'Me' in self-referential awareness: a neurocognitive hypothesis.

Cogn Process. 2009 Sep 11;

Authors: Tagini A, Raffone A

The nature of the 'self' and self-referential awareness has been one of the most debated issues in philosophy, psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Understanding the neurocognitive bases of self-related representation and processing is also crucial to research on the neural correlates of consciousness. The distinction between an 'I', corresponding to a subjective sense of the self as a thinker and causal agent, and a 'Me', as the objective sense of the self with the unique and identifiable features constituting one's self-image or self-concept, suggested by William James, has been re-elaborated by authors from different theoretical perspectives. In this article, empirical studies and theories about the 'I' and the 'Me' in cognition and self-related awareness are reviewed, including the relationships between self and perception, self and memory, the development of the self, self-referential stimulus processing, as well as related neuroimaging studies. Subsequently, the relations between self and different aspects of consciousness are considered. On the basis of the reviewed literature and with reference to Block's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, a neurocognitive hypothesis is formulated about 'I'-related and 'Me'-related self-referential awareness. This hypothesis is extended to metacognitive awareness and a form of non-transitive consciousness, characteristic of meditation experiences and studies, with particular reference to the notion of mindfulness and other Buddhist constructs.

Inducing a virtual hand ownership illusion through a brain-computer interface

Inducing a virtual hand ownership illusion through a brain-computer interface.

Neuroreport. 2009 Apr 22;20(6):589-594

Authors: Perez-Marcos D, Slater M, Sanchez-Vives MV

The apparently stable brain representation of our bodies is easily challenged. We have recently shown that the illusion of ownership of a three-dimensional virtual hand can be evoked through synchronous tactile stimulation of a person's hidden real hand and that of the virtual hand. This reproduces the well-known rubber-hand illusion, but in virtual reality. Here we show that some aspects of the illusion can also occur through motor imagery used to control movements of a virtual hand. When movements of the virtual hand followed motor imagery, the illusion of ownership of the virtual hand was evoked and muscle activity measured through electromyogram correlated with movements of the virtual arm. Using virtual bodies has a great potential in the fields of physical and neural rehabilitation, making the understanding of ownership of a virtual body highly relevant.